nemorathwald: (flying spaghetti monster)
nemorathwald ([personal profile] nemorathwald) wrote2006-11-13 06:02 pm

Morality is as real and unreal as any other software.



This is a video of Richard Dawkins conducting a Q&A, mostly with students and faculty from Jerry Falwell's Liberty University.

The Christian interlocutors persistently repeated a slightly different question than Dawkins seemed to think they were asking. There are two questions about morality in their context: "First, does any such thing exist at all?" and second, "Once having settled that there exists a distinction between right and wrong, why do any humans abide by it?" Dawkins offered a persuasive explanation from evolution for the existence of a moral sense motivating us to be nice the same way lust motivates us to have sex.

What they really wanted to hear was whether "moral" and "immoral" are distinguishable; whether these are words with any measurable referent. I can show that they are. I've discussed this with Dr. Dawkins over internet relay chat with Universists, but I'm not sure he was sufficiently convinced to start offering it to audiences. In any case, it satisfies me.

In one sense, morality exists; in another sense, it doesn't. Morality exists in the same form that economics, linguistics, and chess exist. It is as real as they are, and also sort of unreal by the same standards by which money and language are partially unreal. These are all systems of rules that people invent, within which they can conduct transactions.

Rule sets are as real and unreal as any other software. Processors juggle electricity from circuit to circuit according to software rules, in a set of transactions. We can observe and measure them, so they're real, but when the electrons stop moving in the circuits, where did the calculation go? It was never "there." It was never any place in particular.

The English language was not floating out there in some metaphysical form, waiting to be discovered by the first English speaker. Neither was the rule set of chess. We can even invent alternatives to them. Neither does morality have independent existence. And yet I hardly think a theist will carry the argument through, and say we have no ability to tell, within broad limits, whether someone is measurably practicing "correct" English and "correct" F.I.D.E. chess.

"I can just carry on hurting people as much as I want" is like saying "I will speak my own language to myself that no one else knows, and play my own chess-like game against myself." Rule sets are not objectively real, and subjectively they can be whatever you want if you never make any interpersonal transactions with them; but intersubjectively they are as real as bedrock. You can carve bedrock, but you can't wish it away. Believe me, I have some experience with artificial languages, chess variants, and artificially-designed religions. You still have to know English, and you won't get many people to play any chess-like game other than Chess.

You can even say "I don't particularly like morality and I don't want to participate in that system", and still meaningfully tell more or less whether someone is doing it.

We have chess pieces, dollar bills, writing and sound waves as physical representations of rule sets. But that's all they do-- represent information systems the way the logic alphabet serves as cognitive ergonomics for formal logic. These are just prosthetic devices to help us measure, the way an abacus would help our primate brains perform arithmetic. I'm not sure there is any such equivalent physical device for moral reasoning, which could be where some of the confusion of godbotherers is coming from.

Yes, we can observe and measure morality without fleeing into irrationalism, the same way we can do so with economics. As with so many Christian philosophical "solutions", their solution utterly destroys what they were using it to support.

Take the argument from First Cause, which they also addressed to Professor Dawkins. The premise is that everything must have a cause. Therefore the universe must have a cause. Therefore that cause is God. But what caused God? An intelligence fully-formed at the beginning of the universe is, as Professor Dawkins so eloquently described, massively more implausible than even the weakest explanation of the Big Bang from physics. Infinite complexity can arise incrementally from simple rules through blind, purposeless evolution, but doesn't spring to life fully-formed. Our primate brains are only familiar with complicated things making simpler things, but that instinct of our primate brains is wrong.

If we are willing to make an exemption to causation, it's less ridiculous to say the universe itself is uncaused than God. At least we know the universe exists, and Occam's Razor says not to multiply entities unnecessarily. I wish Professor Dawkins had replied "Wait a minute. Either everything must have a cause, or not. You posited everything must have a cause, therefore, if that is so, God must." But that is precisely the kind of double standard used by religious apologists. They only find God more plausible as a first cause because matter and energy, time and space aren't the Alpha Monkey in the tribe, to whom our primate brain seeks to give up our responsibility for thinking.

So it is with their own reasons for declaring morality to be a meaningful, measurable distinction. It is; just not for their reasons. The problem is that the primate brain doesn't see right and wrong coming from the suffering of the victim, but coming from the Alpha Male Monkey. Just as in the First Cause argument, God results from an abdication of personal responsibility for reasoning. Right and wrong are whatever the Alpha Male Monkey say they are. The suffering of the victim doesn't matter to an obedience-based morality.

Just as doing all arithmetic with a calculator leaves one innumerate, looking up rules on a list doesn't practice moral reasoning and leaves one morally illiterate.

[identity profile] http://users.livejournal.com/jer_/ 2006-11-15 02:21 am (UTC)(link)
"But just how specifically can genetics control such a thing? That's really hard to tell. There is an argument for a non-genetic component, based purely on sociology, and the "passing down" of morality from one generation to the next, primarily via story telling. But then again, our ability to tell stories is also genetically encoded as a particular brain structure/organization, so I guess I'd have to say whatever the answer, it is complex and multifactorial, but ultimately not inexplicable."

Yes! These are questions that I'm very much intrigued by. Not, mind you, intrigued enough to do any research or searching... but intrigued nonetheless. :) How much of what goes on in our minds relate to chemical/genetic/structural things, and how much is the "mind" (or whatever you want to call it). It's not inexplicable, it's ineffable, which is much more fun to say... in-F-able!

[identity profile] rachelann1977.livejournal.com 2006-11-15 02:29 am (UTC)(link)
a good word indeed! I actually had to look it up to make sure I knew what it meant :-p

I can't resist answering this one. I've recently come to see the mind as a much less ephemeral thing than I used to think of it as. I now believe that what we call mind, and assume is separate from body, really is not at all separate from the body. Instead it is that wonderful amalgomation of chemical responses in the brain taken together, both long-term and short-term. All of the pathways that are unique to the individual, along with the broad strokes that we all require for life. We don't see all of the minute individual functions, we see it as a whole, and call it mind. Maybe in another 10 years, I'll see it differently again, but that's my current take.

[identity profile] matt-arnold.livejournal.com 2006-11-15 04:06 am (UTC)(link)
Moral reasoning is like arithmetic. Granted, our empathy and fairness are evolved instincts, but working out the relative rightness and wrongness of particular actions is a feature of reasoning. It's no different from figuring out how to build a building so that it won't fall down. You look at who owes what to whom, and who got what benefit from whom, whether they earned it, or what they reciprocated with.

Notice all those economic terms. Economics is probably the field most closely related to ethical philosophy. With money we make judgements of value. Those values are based on our desires-- our instinctual drives-- sure. Granted. But we can still weigh things against each other in each transaction. We can still count money with our higher brain and not rely on instinct.

In the same way, you figure out that stealing, for instance, is wrong because one side of the transaction is missing. We exchange reputation like currency, and blame is debt. We say an ex-con has "repaid his debt to society." One may as well ask why we "evolved to think that 2 + 2 equals 4" as to ask why we "evolved to think stealing is wrong". It's because when you take two dollars and another two dollars, they really are four dollars. Saying it's three really is bad math. Building a building in such a way that it falls down really is bad architecture. Stealing really is bad ethics. And so on.

[identity profile] rachelann1977.livejournal.com 2006-11-15 12:52 pm (UTC)(link)
In many cases, I totally agree with this, but it's still a fact that reasoning comes from the brain, and the way we reason has also evelved. Just because something is true doesn't mean we should know that it's true. As I said above, it's more than just one part of the brain, and it's a complex interaction of multiple factors.